Entra ID – Deep Dive – Entra ID Authentication – Part 3

Entra ID – Deep Dive – Entra ID Authentication – Part 3

This is part of my series on Microsoft Entra ID:

  1. Entra ID – Deep Dive – The Basics – Part 1
  2. Entra ID – Deep Dive – Protocol Primer – Part 2
  3. Entra ID – Deep Dive – Entra ID Authentication – Part 3

Back for more are ya? Today we’re gonna chat about how you could add Entra ID authentication into your custom-built web application. I’ll be digging into the Entra ID application registration process and examining the requests and responses for the whole authentication process via a local proxy using HTTP Toolkit. The goal here is not to give you coding best practices (god save you if you use any of my code in production) but instead to help you understand how all this stuff works and how products are (and are not) exercising the OIDC and OAuth protocols under the hood.

If you haven’t read my first and second post in the series, stop what you’re doing right now and read them. I’m going into this post assuming you have and thus assuming knowledge and understanding basic Entra ID concepts like applications vs service principals and a foundational understanding of OIDC and OAuth.

The solution design I’m building towards this in this series of posts is a simple frontend web application and backend API that are using Entra ID for authentication and authorization. The end design will look something like the below. This post will focus on the frontend web application.

Series solution design

Creating the frontend application registration

As I covered in my first post, the application registration (or application resource) is the globally unique representation of the application across Entra ID. There can only be one application registration for an application across all Entra ID tenants. An application registration can be single tenant (used only in your Entra ID tenant) or multi-tenant (can be used across Entra ID tenants). I like to think of the process of creating the application process similar to the manual client registration process mentioned in the OAuth spec. The result is the same as we’ll configure a bunch of information required for OAuth such as the redirect URI, the grant types it supports, and whether the client will be public or confidential client. Once registered, Entra will return a unique client_id and client_secret if a confidential application. There are additional Entra-specific properties we can populate, but the manual client registration explanation makes the most sense in my brain at least.

Creating an application registration can be done through the Portal, CLI/PowerShell, REST, Terraform, etc. I’m going to create it direct through the Microsoft Graph REST API because I want to walk through all the gory properties. To create an app registration, your user account needs to be at least hold the Entra ID Application Developer role. To keep things simple and address my laziness, my user will be setup as a global admin.

# Set the properties for the application
app_display_name = "Demo frontend app for Entra authentication"
description = "This app is used to demonstrate a frontend application where a user authenticates using Entra ID authentication via OIDC"
contact = "business_unit1@my.com"
........
# Create an app registration
def create_app_registration(display_name: str, contact: str):
"""This function creates a new application registration in Microsoft Graph API if it doesn't already exist
Args:
display_name (str): The display name for the new application registration.
contact (str): The contact information to associate with the application registration.
Returns:
dict: The details of the created application registration.
"""
check_app = get_app_registration_by_display_name(display_name)
if check_app is not None:
print(f"Application {check_app['displayName']} already exists and its id is {check_app['id']}")
return check_app
else:
print("Creating new application registration...")
body = {
"displayName": display_name,
"description": description,
# Setting to false means this is a confidential client application vs a public client
"isFallbackPublicClient": False,
# Set a service management reference which can be the contact associated with the application
"serviceManagementReference": contact,
# Create the app as multi tenant; single tenant would use AzureADMyOrg
"signInAudience": "AzureADMultipleOrgs",
# Add a redirect URI to support OIDC authentication
"web": {
"redirectUris": [
"http://localhost:8100/callback"
]
}
}
response = requests.post(
'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json=body
)
return response.json()
app_frontend = create_app_registration(app_display_name, contact)
print(json.dumps(app_frontend, indent=2))

The application registration I’m creating above is being created as a multi-tenant application instead of a single tenant application and is determined by the signInAudience being set to a value of AzureADMultipleOrgs. I’m doing this because I may do an additional post in this series walking through multi-tenant applications. Most of the application registrations you create will be single tenant and would have this property set to AzureADMyOrg.

Since I’m building a web application, I’m going to be configuring it as a confidential client (which means it will have a credential) and I’m going to use the authorization code flow. I don’t want my application registration to ever support being used as a public client so I set isFallbackPublicClient to false. This will force my client to provide a credential when attempting to obtain a token. If you were building an application that would live direct on the user’s desktop or mobile device, you’d need to set to that true because at that point your application would be a public client.

Under the web property, I’m setting the redirectUri property to the endpoint in my application I want the user redirected to after the user successfully authenticates to Entra ID and consents to whatever scope the application (or OAuth client) is requesting. In this case, my application runs directly on my machine so this is set to localhost.

You’ll also see I’m setting the serviceManagementReference property. Best practice is for you to set this property with a contact within the business unit for that owns the application. This can be helpful if the application registration becomes stale at this point and you detect that during your regular audits (which OF COURSE you’re doing!)

Once complete, I get the response below.

Creating new application registration...
{
"@odata.context": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/$metadata#applications/$entity",
"id": "be0af053-faf4-44b3-b071-XXXXXXXX",
"deletedDateTime": null,
"appId": "fc815c55-d456-4d38-be76-XXXXXXXX",
"applicationTemplateId": null,
"disabledByMicrosoftStatus": null,
"createdByAppId": "04b07795-8ddb-461a-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"createdDateTime": "2026-06-25T01:19:12.1150491Z",
"displayName": "Demo frontend app for Entra authentication",
"description": "This app is used to demonstrate a frontend application where a user authenticates using Entra ID authentication via OIDC",
"groupMembershipClaims": null,
"identifierUris": [],
"isDeviceOnlyAuthSupported": null,
"isDisabled": null,
"isFallbackPublicClient": false,
"nativeAuthenticationApisEnabled": null,
"notes": null,
"publisherDomain": "XXXXXXXX.onmicrosoft.com",
"serviceManagementReference": "business_unit1@jogcloud.com",
"signInAudience": "AzureADMultipleOrgs",
"tags": [],
"tokenEncryptionKeyId": null,
"uniqueName": null,
"samlMetadataUrl": null,
"defaultRedirectUri": null,
"certification": null,
"optionalClaims": null,
"servicePrincipalLockConfiguration": null,
"requestSignatureVerification": null,
"addIns": [],
"api": {
"acceptMappedClaims": null,
"knownClientApplications": [],
"requestedAccessTokenVersion": null,
"oauth2PermissionScopes": [],
"preAuthorizedApplications": []
},
"appRoles": [],
"info": {
"logoUrl": null,
"marketingUrl": null,
"privacyStatementUrl": null,
"supportUrl": null,
"termsOfServiceUrl": null
},
"keyCredentials": [],
"parentalControlSettings": {
"countriesBlockedForMinors": [],
"legalAgeGroupRule": "Allow"
},
"passwordCredentials": [],
"publicClient": {
"redirectUris": []
},
"requiredResourceAccess": [],
"verifiedPublisher": {
"displayName": null,
"verifiedPublisherId": null,
"addedDateTime": null
},
"web": {
"homePageUrl": null,
"logoutUrl": null,
"redirectUris": [
"http://localhost:8100/callback"
],
"implicitGrantSettings": {
"enableAccessTokenIssuance": false,
"enableIdTokenIssuance": false
},
"redirectUriSettings": [
{
"uri": "http://localhost:8100/callback",
"index": null
}
]
},
"spa": {
"redirectUris": []
}
}

Next up, I want to set an owner. Every application registration should have an owner and this is a child object of the application. Now don’t go willy-nilly throwing any business unit person into that field (the owner cannot be a group as of the date of this post). When a user is an owner of an application registration, they can modify the application registration. The owner should be set to some privileged user account in Entra where access to that privileged account is tightly controlled.

import requests
import json
# Set the owners of the application using their Entra ID user object id
owners = [
"2e69d9f2-b5b3-482b-9c15-XXXXXXXXXXXX"
]
........
# Add owners to the application registration
def add_owners_app_registration(owners: list, app_id: str):
"""This function adds owners to an application registration in Microsoft Graph API
Args:
owners (list): A list of Entra ID user object IDs to add as owners.
app_id (str): The object ID of the application registration to add owners to.
Returns:
list: The updated list of owners for the application registration.
"""
# Check the current owners to see if the owner is already listed
check_owners = get_app_registration_owner(app_id)
if check_owners is not None:
for owner in owners:
if owner in [o['id'] for o in check_owners]:
print(f"Owner {owner} is already an owner of the application.")
# Since owner isn't there, add it
else:
print(f"Adding owner {owner} to the application...")
response = requests.post(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{app_id}/owners/$ref',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json={
"@odata.id": f"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/{owner}"
}
)
if response.status_code == 204:
print(f"Owner {owner} added successfully.")
else:
print(f"Failed to add owner {owner}. Response: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")
else:
print("No current owners found for the application.")
for owner in owners:
print(f"Adding owner {owner} to the application...")
response = requests.post(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{app_id}/owners/$ref',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json={
"@odata.id": f"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryObjects/{owner}"
}
)
if response.status_code == 204:
print(f"Owner {owner} added successfully.")
else:
print(f"Failed to add owner {owner}. Response: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")
new_owners = get_app_registration_owner(app_id)
return new_owners
new_owners = add_owners_app_registration(owners = owners, app_id=app_frontend['id'])
print(json.dumps(new_owners, indent=2))

Next up I need to create a client credential for my application. This will act as its client_secret to support its confidential client status. Entra ID supports multiple types of credentials including a basic client secret, client certificate, and federated credential. Of the three, the federated credential is the sweet spot if you can make it work. This is where you can use something like a managed identity which means the actual secret is automatically managed and rotated by Microsoft. Way easier lifecycle. Federated credentials can also use external identity providers, like GCP, GitHub and others neat integrations via the workload identity federation. A client certificate should be your next preferred credential since it has higher assurance and avoids having to worry about secret rotation and leakage. Since I’m lazy, I’ll be using a client secret.

Below I create a client secret that will be valid for a year.

# Create a date one year from now that will be used to expire the app registration credential
start_date = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
end_date = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + relativedelta(years=1)).replace(hour=23, minute=59, second=59, microsecond=0)
formatted_start_date = start_date.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')
formatted_end_date = end_date.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')
.........
# Create a client secret
def create_password_credential(app_id, end_date, start_date, override=False):
"""This function creates a password credential for an application registration in Microsoft Graph API. It will delete existing
credentials if override is set to True, otherwise it will return a message that a credential already exists.
Args:
app_id (str): The object ID of the application registration to create a password credential for.
end_date (str): The end date and time for the password credential in ISO 8601 format.
start_date (str): The start date and time for the password credential in ISO 8601 format.
override (bool): Whether to override existing password credentials. Defaults to False.
Returns:
dict: The deatils of the created password credential or a blank dict if a credential already exists and override is False.
"""
# Check to see if the app already has a password credential
app = get_app_registration(app_id)
if app['passwordCredentials'] == []:
# Create a new credential
body = {
"displayName": "primary",
"endDateTime": end_date,
"startDateTime": start_date
}
response = requests.post(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/applications/{app_id}/addPassword',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json=body
)
if response.status_code != 200:
print(f"Error creating password credential: {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
else:
print("Created new password credential.")
return response.json()
elif override:
# Delete existing credentials
for cred in app['passwordCredentials']:
print("Deleting existing password credential...")
response = requests.post(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/applications/{app_id}/removePassword',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json={
"keyId": cred['keyId']
}
)
if response.status_code != 204:
print(f"Error deleting password credential: {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
# Create a new credential
body = {
"displayName": "primary",
"endDateTime": end_date,
"startDateTime": start_date
}
response = requests.post(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/applications/{app_id}/addPassword',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json=body
)
if response.status_code != 200:
print(f"Error creating password credential: {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
else:
print("Created new password credential after deleting existing one.")
return response.json()
else:
print("A secret already exists. You can delete it and create a new one by setting override=True")
return app['passwordCredentials'][0]
password_credential_frontend = create_password_credential(app_frontend['id'], formatted_end_date, formatted_start_date, override=False)

Alright, at this point we have an application registration and client credential, which essentially means we have manually registered the application as an OAuth client to the authorization server (Entra ID). I now have a client_id (appId property) and client_secret. What next?

Creating the frontend service principal

I now need a security principal (or identity) to act as an identity for this instance of my application in this Entra ID tenant. In comes the service principal. There are many types of service principals as I mentioned previously, for this use case I’ll be creating an application service principal. Manual creation of this is only required because I’m creating it programmatically through REST. If I created this app registration in Azure Portal a service principal would automatically be created.

Creating the service principal is very straightforward and there’s not much need you to pass beyond the appId (or client id) of the application registration. Most of the properties are synchronized from the application resource the service principal is being created for. You’ll reference the appId of the application resource which handles the mapping back to the application resource.

def create_service_principal(app_id: str):
"""This function creates a service principal for an application registration in Microsoft Graph API if it doesn't already exist
Args:
app_id (str): The application ID of the service principal to create.
Returns:
dict or None: The details of the created service principal if successful, otherwise None.
"""
# Check to see if the service principal already exists
service_principal = get_service_principal_by_app_id(app_id)
if service_principal is not None:
print(f"Service principal already exists: {service_principal['id']}")
return service_principal
else:
body = {
"appId": app_id
}
response = requests.post(
'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json=body
)
if response.status_code == 201:
return response.json()
else:
print(f"Error creating service principal: {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
return None
# Get or create the service principal
service_principal_frontend = create_service_principal(app_frontend['appId'])
print(json.dumps(service_principal_frontend, indent=2))

This spits out a new service principal object seen below. If we want the instance of the application to access any resources itself or in a delegated manner, the service principal will be the resource that is granted the permissions.

{
"@odata.context": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/$metadata#servicePrincipals/$entity",
"id": "ce341fd2-fd6b-4dab-9beb-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"deletedDateTime": null,
"accountEnabled": true,
"alternativeNames": [],
"appDisplayName": "Demo frontend app for Entra authentication",
"appDescription": "This app is used to demonstrate a frontend application where a user authenticates using Entra ID authentication via OIDC",
"appId": "fc815c55-d456-4d38-be76-XXXXXXXXXXX",
"applicationTemplateId": null,
"appOwnerOrganizationId": "6c80de31-d5e4-4029-93e4-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"appRoleAssignmentRequired": false,
"createdByAppId": "04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"createdDateTime": "2026-06-25T01:41:05Z",
"description": null,
"disabledByMicrosoftStatus": null,
"displayName": "Demo frontend app for Entra authentication",
"homepage": null,
"isDisabled": null,
"loginUrl": null,
"logoutUrl": null,
"notes": null,
"notificationEmailAddresses": [],
"preferredSingleSignOnMode": null,
"preferredTokenSigningKeyThumbprint": null,
"replyUrls": [
"http://localhost:8100/callback"
],
"servicePrincipalNames": [
"fc815c55-d456-4d38-be76-XXXXXXXXXXX
],
"servicePrincipalType": "Application",
"signInAudience": "AzureADMultipleOrgs",
"tags": [],
"tokenEncryptionKeyId": null,
"samlSingleSignOnSettings": null,
"addIns": [],
"appRoles": [],
"info": {
"logoUrl": null,
"marketingUrl": null,
"privacyStatementUrl": null,
"supportUrl": null,
"termsOfServiceUrl": null
},
"keyCredentials": [],
"oauth2PermissionScopes": [],
"passwordCredentials": [],
"resourceSpecificApplicationPermissions": [],
"verifiedPublisher": {
"displayName": null,
"verifiedPublisherId": null,
"addedDateTime": null
}
}

Document your required permissions!

It’s best practice to document the permission your application will require versus being an asshole and forcing someone to guess, struggle, learn to hate you, and likely over permission. While this isn’t required for delegated permissions, it’s still best practice if possible. It should be possible in almost all instances (with some exceptions for agents if you’re brave enough). Permissions are divided into two categories which include role permissions and scope permissions. Role permissions are going to be the permissions the app exercises using its own identity context (we’ll see some of this in a future post) and scope permissions are going to be delegated permissions it requires. The permissions an application requires can be documented as part of the app registration (or application resource) by setting the requiredResourceAccess property of the application registration. This doesn’t grant any access, but simply informs the administrator what permissions will be required from the application. It doesn’t prohibit the administrator or user granting it additional permissions beyond what is required.

# Get the existing app permissions
def get_app_permissions(id: str):
"""This function retrieves the existing permissions required for an application registration from the Microsoft Graph API.
Args:
id (str): The object ID of the application registration to retrieve permissions for.
Returns:
list: A list of required resource permissions or else an empty list
"""
response = requests.get(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{id}',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
}
)
if response.status_code != 200:
print(f"Error getting app permissions: {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
return None
# Return the current permission set or a blank array if there are no permissions currently set
return response.json().get('requiredResourceAccess') or []
# Add the app permissions to the app registration. This is useful for multi-tenant apps to document required permissions. It does not grant any permissions.
def add_app_permissions(app_id: str, resource_access: list):
"""This function adds the required permissions to an application registration in Microsoft Graph API
Args:
app_id (str): The object ID of the application registration to add permissions to.
resource_access (list): A list of permissions to add to the application registration in the format of requiredResourceAccess.
Returns:
dict or None: The updated application registration details if successful, otherwise None.
"""
# Get the existing permissions in order to append to them
app_permissions = get_app_permissions(app_id)
# Append the new permissions to the existing ones
for permission in resource_access:
# Check if this resource already exists in the app permissions
existing_resource = None
for resource in app_permissions:
if resource['resourceAppId'] == permission['resourceAppId']:
existing_resource = resource
break
if existing_resource:
# Append the new permissions to the existing resource
for access in permission['resourceAccess']:
if access not in existing_resource['resourceAccess']:
existing_resource['resourceAccess'].append(access)
else:
# Add the new resource and its permissions
app_permissions.append(permission)
# Update the app registration with the new permissions
body = {
"requiredResourceAccess": app_permissions
}
response = requests.patch(
f'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{app_id}',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': f'Bearer {user_token.token}'
},
json=body
)
if response.status_code != 204:
print(f"Error adding app permissions: {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
return None
else:
print("App permissions documented as required successfully.")
return get_app_registration(app_id)
new_permissions = [
{
"resourceAppId": "00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000", # Microsoft Graph
"resourceAccess": [
{
"id": "e1fe6dd8-ba31-4d61-89e7-88639da4683d", # User.Read
"type": "Scope"
}
]
}
]
app_required_permissions = add_app_permissions(app_frontend['id'], new_permissions)['requiredResourceAccess']
print("\n=== App required permissions ===")
print(json.dumps(app_required_permissions, indent=2))

Once those are added they will appear in the API permissions section of the Application Registration inside of the Azure Portal as seen below. For my app I’m documenting that it requires the User.Read delegated permission on the Microsoft Graph API. For some of the built-in applications like the Microsoft Graph, some permissions will require admin consent and some will not like User.Read. Like I covered in my first post, this is determined by the creator of the application resource when they define the scopes. If you add these things programmatically it’s a bit more work because you need to dig up the resource’s appId and object ids of the permission. Something like Microsoft Graph is well documented. For other applications, you’ll need to do some digging via API calls.

Alright, at this point we’re ready to test our app!

Authenticating to the application

After starting the application I immediately see a lookup to metadata endpoint for the OIDC and OAuth endpoints. This is triggered an MSAL instance is started in the code. These endpoints will be used throughout the login process.

Opening my website I’m faced with a very simple login screen (simple setup for a simple man).

Once I click login with Entra ID, the underlining MSAL library redirects me to the /authorize endpoint of Entra where my user is prompted to authenticate. The request that is generated is below.

https://login.microsoftonline.com/6c80de31-d5e4-4029-93e4-XXXXXXXXXXXX/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?
client_id=afbd7539-a21f-4d11-93a3-XXXXXXXXXXXX&
response_type=code&
redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8100%2Fcallback&
scope=User.Read+offline_access+openid+profile&
state=iuxzJhtpdQrWHKqG&code_challenge=L2KNF971_Izy0wWY4v_8GJ1XXXXXXXXXXXX&
code_challenge_method=S256&
nonce=b448a1420a781ac5f18bc2db7f74e06a42fbedca3dd04ebdXXXXXXXXXXXX&
client_info=1

In this request we see all the things we covered in the second post for the protocol primer. There is the redirect URI that the user will be redirected to after authenticating to Entra ID, the response_type indicating this is the authorization code grant type, the client id of my application, the state property used to mitigate CSRF attacks, the nonce to prevent replay attacks, and the code challenge and code challenge method for PKCE.

Now one thing to note is you’ll find a lot of samples on the wider Internet for MSAL (and likely generated by LLMs if you’re one of those vibe coders) that will use the acquire_token_for_client method (like this Microsoft sample here). This method WILL NOT use PKCE. If you want to include the code challenge and code verifier for PKCE you will need to use the initiate_auth_code_flow method.

The scopes query perimeter includes the Microsoft Graph User.Read permission, offline_access (for a refresh token), openid (for an id token), and profile (for access to the user’s basic profile for OIDC). The code in my app specifically requests User.Read, the remaining scopes are automatically added by MSAL for each request depending on the method you’re calling. Most documentation out there will tell you that you can’t exclude them, but you actually can using the exclude_scopes property.

My user completes the authentication process and the user is then prompted to consent to the application’s service principal to be delegated the requested scopes. Once the user accepts, the user’s consent is saved in Entra ID and the user is no longer required to consent moving forward. You’ll notice my application says app is unverified because it’s using localhost. For anything remotely relating to production, you should configure a publishing domain and validate it.

Once the user consents, the user is redirected to the redirect uri registered for the application with an authorization code generated by Entra ID. My application then makes a call to the /oauth2/v2.0/token endpoint in Entra to exchange the authorization code for an access token, identity token, and refresh token. It provides its client secret to authenticate itself to Entra and the code_verifier value allowing Entra to validate this is the original client who requested the access token (PKCE).

Entra validates the client secret and code verifier and if valid returns an access token, refresh token, and id token. My application can use the id token to authenticate the user and grant it access to the application.

Once logged in, I navigate to the profile page of the application. This page has basic profile information about the user collected from the get user endpoint in the Microsoft Graph.

Navigating to the tokens page of the application displays the decoded access token and id token. In the payload of the id token we can see this id token is intended for the application (which you must validate in your code to ensure someone isn’t trying to pass you some rando token meant for another application) via the aud claim. We also get some basic information about the user. The full schema of the id token is in the official public docs. Some of the helpful properties are the user’s full name and their object id (oid). The object id could be used to pull additional information about the user (which we’ll see next post). We can also stuff additional claims in this id token if we wanted to. I’ll demonstrate this in a future post where I add a user’s group memberships into the id token.

{
"aud": "fc815c55-d456-4d38-be76-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"exp": 1782358405,
"iat": 1782354505,
"iss": "https://login.microsoftonline.com/6c80de31-d5e4-4029-93e4-XXXXXXXXXXXX/v2.0",
"name": "Carl Carlson",
"nbf": 1782354505,
"nonce": "19297055204c96a487b701f62890cf1c867a7fac55814081f53cbe4XXXXXXXX",
"oid": "2e69d9f2-b5b3-482b-9c15-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"preferred_username": "carl.carlson@jogcloud.com",
"rh": "1.AbcAMd6AbOTVKUCT5ForPA4SmVVcgfxW1XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"sid": "005f65fa-bad8-71a5-49eb-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"sub": "p9RBIgpi113pdPH37Q50qylIbANwgMtDXXXXXXXXXXXX",
"tid": "6c80de31-d5e4-4029-93e4-XXXXXXXXXXXX",
"uti": "tL2-eu4OB0KFhXGl7j4UAA",
"ver": "2.0"
}

The end-to-end flow

So I’ve authenticated my user to the application using OIDC and gained delegated access to the Microsoft Graph API via OAuth all using Entra. Not too shabby. This is the most basic of basic use cases. In my next post I’ll walk you through how to add group information to the id or access token which you could use within your application to authorize the user within the application.

I’m a big fan of old school style protocol flow diagrams, so I threw one together that walks through the end-to-end process I’ve outlined today.

Summing It Up

Yeah, I know that was a lot. If all you take out of this post is a better understanding of what app registrations and service principals do and have a general understanding of how they’re structured, and what the protocol flow looks like when using Entra ID for OIDC/OAuth, that’s a win.

If you want to muck around with this stuff yourself in a personal or test tenant, I’ve published all the code I put together to run through these posts in this repository. It’s a work in progress which I’m fine-tuning as I write these posts but it does have the sample frontend app included in it if you want to take a glance at my application-level code and perhaps want to replicate what I walked through today. Please do not use any of this code in a production app. This is purely intended to demonstrate the concepts. I’m constantly modifying it, so YMMV if it works any given day.

Some key takeaways for you:

  1. Every app registration should have an owner. Just be aware the owner can modify the app registration so don’t go nuts and give this to a non-privileged user.
  2. Set the servericeManagementReference property to some type of BU-level distribution list. This will cover you in case the owners are wiped out through someone accidentally removing them or them leaving the company.
  3. Make sure you’re using the correct methods in the MSAL library if your goal is to use PKCE to align with OAuth 2.1.
  4. If you setup an app registration, be a good human being and document the permissions the app is going to require. You’re not required to, it should be a must for multi-tenant applications especially. It doesn’t limit what users and administrators can grant the application, but can act as minimum set of permissions to function.
  5. When configuring an app registration that will be a confidential client, try to use a federated identity credential. If your app is running in Azure, you can use a managed identity. This will both be more secure and make your app owner’s life a little less miserable having to rotate credentials.

See you next post!

Integrating Azure AD and G-Suite – Automated Provisioning

Integrating Azure AD and G-Suite – Automated Provisioning

Today I’ll wrap up my series on Azure Active Directory’s (Azure AD) integration with Google’s G-Suite.  In my first entry I covered the single-sign on (SSO) integration and in my second and third posts I gave an overview of Google’s Cloud Platform (GCP) and demonstrated how to access a G-Suite domain’s resources through Google’s APIs.  In this post I’m going to cover how Microsoft provides automated provisioning of user, groups, and contacts .  If you haven’t read through my posts on Google’s API (part 1, part 2) take a read through so you’re more familiar with the concepts I’ll be covering throughout this post.

SSO using SAML or Open ID Connect is a common capability of most every cloud solutions these days.  While that solves the authentication problem, the provisioning of users, groups, and other identity-relates objects remains a challenge largely due to the lack of widely accepted standards (SCIM has a ways to go folks).  Vendors have a variety of workarounds including making LDAP calls back to a traditional on-premises directory (YUCK), supporting uploads of CSV files, or creating and updating identities in its local databases based upon the information contained in a SAML assertion or Open ID Connect id token.  A growing number of vendors are exposing these capabilities via a web-based API.  Google falls into this category and provides a robust selection of APIs to interact with its services from Gmail to resources within Google Cloud Platform, and yes even Google G-Suite.

If you’re a frequent user of Azure AD, you’ll have run into the automatic provisioning capabilities it brings to the table across a wide range of cloud services.  In a previous series I covered its provisioning capabilities with Amazon Web Services.  This is another use case where Microsoft leverages a third party’s robust API to simplify the identity management lifecycle.

In the SSO Quickstart Guide Microsoft provides for G-Suite it erroneously states:

“Google Apps supports auto provisioning, which is by default enabled. There is no action for you in this section. If a user doesn’t already exist in Google Apps Software, a new one is created when you attempt to access Google Apps Software.”

This simply isn’t true.  While auto provisioning via the API can be done, it is a feature you need to code to and isn’t enabled by default.  When you enable SSO to G-Suite and attempt to access it using an assertion containing the claim for a user that does not exist within a G-Suite domain you receive the error below.

google4int1

This establishes what we already knew in that identities representing our users attempting SSO to G-Suite need to be created before the users can authenticate.  Microsoft provides a Quickstart for auto provisioning into G-Suite.  The document does a good job telling you were to click and giving some basic advice but really lacks in the detail into what’s happening in the background and describing how it works.

Let’s take a deeper look shall we?

If you haven’t already, add the Google Apps application from the Azure AD Application Gallery.  Once the application is added navigate to the blade for the application and select the Provisioning page.  Switch the provisioning mode from manual to automatic.

google4int2.png

Right off the bat we see a big blue Authorize button which tells us that Microsoft is not using the service accounts pattern for accessing the Google API.  Google’s recommendation is to use the service account pattern when accessing project-based data rather than user specific data.  The argument can be made that G-Suite data doesn’t fall under project-based data and the service account credential doesn’t make sense.  Additionally using a service account would require granting the account domain-wide delegation for the G-Suite domain allowing the account to impersonate any user in the G-Suite domain.  Not really ideal, especially from an auditing perspective.

By using the Server-side Web Apps pattern a new user in G-Suite can be created and assigned as the “Azure AD account”. The downfall with of this means you’re stuck paying Google $10.00 a month for a non-human account. The price of good security practices I guess.

google4int3.png

Microsoft documentation states that the account must be granted the Super Admin role. I found this surprising since you’re effectively giving the account god rights to your G-Suite domain. It got me wondering what authorization scopes is Microsoft asking for? Let’s break out Fiddler and walk through the process that kicks off after clicking on the Authorization button.

A new window pops up from Google requesting me to authenticate. Here Azure AD, acting as the OAuth client, has made an authorization request and has sent me along with the request over to the Google which is acting as the authorization server to authenticate, consent to the access, and take the next step in the authorization flow.

google4int4

When I switch over to Fiddler I see a number of sessions have been captured.  Opening the WebForms window of the first session to accounts.google.com a number of parameters that were passed to Google.

google4int5

The first parameter gives us the three authorization scopes Azure AD is looking for.  The admin.directory.group and admin.directory.user are scopes are both related to the Google Directory API, which makes sense if it wants to manage users and groups.  The /m8/feeds scope grants it access to manage contacts via the Google Contacts API.  This is an older API that uses XML instead of JSON to exchange information and looks like it has been/is being replaced by the Google People API.

Management of contacts via this API is where the requirement for an account in the Super Admin role originates.  Google documentation states that management of domain shared contacts via the /m8/feeds API requires an administrator username and password for Google Apps.  I couldn’t find any privilege in G-Suite which could be added to a custom Admin role that mentioned contacts.  Given Google’s own documentation along the lack of an obvious privilege option, this may be a hard limitation of G-Suite.  Too bad too because there are options for both Users and Groups.  Either way, the request for this authorization scope drives the requirement for Super Admin for the account Azure AD will be using for delegated access.

The redirect_uri is the where Google sends the user after the authorization request is complete.  The response_type tells us Azure AD and Google are using the OAuth authorization code grant type flow.  The client_id is the unique identifier Google has assigned to Azure AD in whatever project Microsoft has it built in.  The approval_prompt setting of force tells Google to display the consent window and the data Azure AD wants to access.  Lastly, the access_type setting of offline allows Azure AD to access the APIs without the user being available to authenticate via a refresh token which will be issued along with the access token.  Let’s pay attention to that one once the consent screen pops up.

I plug in valid super user credentials to my G-Suite domain and authenticate and receive the warning below.  This indicates that Microsoft has been naughty and hasn’t had their application reviewed by Google.  This was made a requirement back in July of 2017… so yeah… Microsoft maybe get on that?

google4int6.png

To progress to the consent screen I hit the Advanced link in the lower left and opt to continue.  The consent window then pops up.

google4int7.png

Here I see that Microsoft has registered their application with a friendly name of azure.com.  I’m also shown the scopes that the application wants to access which jive with the authorization scopes we saw in Fiddler.  Remember that offline access Microsoft asked for?  See it mentioned anywhere in this consent page that I’m delegating this access to Microsoft perpetually as long as they ask for a refresh token?  This is one of my problems with OAuth and consent windows like this.  It’s entirely too vague as to how long I’m granting the application access to my data or to do things as me.  Expect to see this OAuth consent attacks continue to grow in in use moving forward.  Why worry about compromising the user’s credentials when I can display a vague consent window and have them grant me access directly to their data?  Totally safe.

Hopping back to the window, I click the Allow button and the consent window closes.  Looking back at Fiddler I see that I received back an authorization code and posted it back to the reply_uri designated in the original authorization request.

google4int8.png

Switching back to the browser window for the Azure Portal the screen updates and the Test Connection button becomes available.  Clicking the button initiates a quick check where Azure AD obtains an access token for the scopes it requires unseen to the user.  After the successful test I hit the Save button.

google4int9.png

Switching to the browser window for the Google Admin Portal let’s take a look at the data that’s been updated for the user I used to authorize Microsoft its access.  For that I select the user, go to the Security section and I now see that the Azure Active Directory service is authorized to the contacts, user, and group management scopes.

google4int10.png

Switching back to the browser window for the Azure Portal I see some additional options are now available.

google4int11.png

The mappings are really interesting and will look familiar to you if you’ve ever done anything with an identity management tool like Microsoft Identity Manager (MIM) or even Azure AD Sync.  The user mappings for example show which attributes in Azure AD are used to populate the attributes in G-Suite.

google4int12.png

The attributes that have the Delete button grayed out are required by Google in order to provision new user accounts in a G-Suite domain.  The options available for deletion are additional data beyond what is required that Microsoft can populate on user accounts it provisions into G-Suite.  Selecting the Show advanced options button, allow you to play with the schema Microsoft is using for G-Suite.   What I found interesting about this schema is it doesn’t match the resource representation Google provides for the API.  It would have been nice to match the two to make it more consumable, but they’re probably working off values used in the old Google Provisioning API or they don’t envision many people being nerdy enough to poke around the schema.

Next up I move toggle the provisioning status from Off to On and leave the Scope option set to sync only the assigned users and groups.

google4int13.png

I then hit the Save button to save the new settings and after a minute my initial synchronization is successful.  Now nothing was synchronized, but it shows the credentials correctly allowed Azure AD to hit my G-Suite domain over the appropriate APIs with the appropriate access.

google4int14.png

So an empty synchronization works, how about one with a user?  I created a new user named dutch.schaefer@geekintheweeds.com with only the required attributes of display name and user principal name populated, assigned the new user to the Google Apps application and give Azure AD a night to run another sync.  Earlier tonight I checked the provisioning summary and verified the sync grabbed the new user.

google4int15.png

Review of the audit logs for the Google Apps application shows that the new user was exported around 11PM EST last night.  If you’re curious the synch between Azure AD and G-Suite occurs about every 20 minutes.

google4int16.png

Notice that the FamilyName and GivenName attributes are set to a period.  I never set the first or last name attributes of the user in Azure AD, so both attributes are blank.  If we bounce back to the attribute mapping and look at the attributes for Google Apps, we see that FamilyName and GivenName are both required meaning Azure AD had to populate them with something.  Different schemas, different requirements.

google4int17

Switching over to the Google Admin Console I see that the new user was successfully provisioned into G-Suite.

google4int18.png

Pretty neat overall.  Let’s take a look at what we learned:

  • Azure AD supports single sign-on to G-Suite via SAML using a service provider-initiated flow where Azure AD acts as the identity provider and G-Suite acts as the service provider.
  • A user object with a login id matching the user’s login id in Azure Active Directory must be created in G-Suite before single sign-on will work.
  • Google provides a number of libraries for its API and the Google API Explorer should be used for experimentation with Google’s APIs.
  • Google’s Directory API is used by Azure AD to provision users and groups into a G-Suite domain.
  • Google’s Contacts API is used by Azure AD to provision contacts into a G-Suite domain.
  • A user holding the Super Admin role in the G-Suite domain must be used to authorize Azure AD to perform provisioning activities.  The Super Admin role is required due to the usage of the Google Contact API.
  • Azure AD’s authorization request includes offline access using refresh tokens to request additional access tokens to ensure the sync process can be run on a regular basis without requiring re-authorization.
  • Best practice is to dedicate a user account in your G-Suite domain to Azure AD.
  • Azure AD uses the Server-side Web pattern for accessing Google’s APIs.
  • The provisioning process will populate a period for any attribute that is required in G-Suite but does not have a value in the corresponding attribute in Azure AD.
  • The provisioning process runs a sync every 20 minutes.

Even though my coding is horrendous, I absolutely loved experimenting with the Google API.  It’s easy to realize why APIs are becoming so critical to a good solution.  With the increased usage of a wide variety of products in a business, being able to plug and play applications is a must.  The provisioning aspect Azure AD demonstrates here is a great example of the opportunities provided when critical functionality is exposed for programmatic access.

I hope you enjoyed the series, learned a bit more about both solutions, and got some insight into what’s going on behind the scenes.

 

Integrating Azure AD and AWS – Part 2

Update: In November 2019 AWS introduced support for integration between Azure AD and AWS SSO.  The integration offers a ton more features, including out of the box support for multiple AWS accounts.  I highly recommend you go that route if you’re looking to integrate the two platforms.  Check out my series on the new integration here.

Today I will continue the journey into the integration between Azure AD and Amazon Web Services.  In my first entry I covered the reasons why you’d want to integrate Azure AD with AWS and provided a high-level overview of how the solution works.  The remaining entries in this series will cover the steps involved in completing the integration including deep dives into the inner workings of the solution.

Let me start out by talking about the testing environment I’ll be using for this series.

lab.png

The environment includes three virtual machines (VMs) running on Windows Server 2016 Hyper V on a server at my house.  The virtual machines consists three servers running Windows Server 2016 with one server acting as a domain controller for the journeyofthegeek.local Active Directory (AD) forest, another server running Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) and Azure AD Connect (AADC), and the third server running MS SQL Server and IIS.  The IIS instance hosts a .NET sample federated application published by Microsoft.

In Microsoft Azure I have a single Vnet configured for connectivity to my on-premises lab through a site-to-site IPSec virtual private network (VPN) I’ve setup with pfSense.  Within the Vnet exists a single VM running Windows 10 that is domain-joined to the journeyofthegeek.local AD domain.  The Azure AD tenant providing the identity backend for the Microsoft Azure subscription is synchronized with the journeyofthegeek.local AD domain using Azure AD Connect and is associated with the domain journeyofthegeek.com.  Authentication to the Azure AD tenant is federated using my instance of AD FS.  I’m not synchronizing passwords and am using an alternate login ID with the user principal name being synchronized to Azure AD being stored in the AD attribute msDS-CloudExtensionAttribute1.  The reason I’m still configured to use an alternate login ID was due to some testing I needed to do for a previous project.

I created a single test user in the journeyofthegeek.local Active Directory domain named Rick Sanchez with a user principal name (UPN) of rick.sanchez@journeyofthegeeklocal and msDS-CloudExtensionAttribute1 of  rick.sanchez@journeyofthegeek.com.  The only attribute to note that the user has populated is the mail attribute which has the value of rick.sanchez@journeyofthegeek.com.  The user is being synchronized to Azure AD via the Azure AD Connect instance.

In AWS I have a single elastic compute cloud (EC2) instance running Windows Server 2016 within a virtual private cloud (VPC).  I’ll be configuring Azure AD as an identity provider associated with the AWS account and will be associating an AWS IAM role named AzureADEC2Admins.  The role will grant full admin rights over the management of the EC2 instances associated to the account via the AmazonEC2FullAccess permissions policy.

Let’s begin shall we?

The first step I’ll be taking is to log into the Azure Portal as an account that is a member of the global admins and navigate to the Azure Active Directory blade.  From there I select Enterprise Applications blade and hit the New Application link.

entapps.png

I then search the application gallery for AWS, select the AWS application, accept the default name, and hit the Add button.  Azure AD will proceed to add the application and will then jump to a quick start page.  So what exactly does it mean to add an application to Azure AD?  Good question, for that we’ll want to use the Azure AD cmdlets.  You can reference this link.

Before we jump into running cmdlets, let’s talk very briefly about the concept of application identities in AAD.  If you’ve managed Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), you’re very familiar with the concept of service accounts.  When you needed an application (let’s call it a non-human to be more in-line with industry terminology) to access AD-integrated resources directly or on-behalf of a user you would create a security principal to represent the non-human.  That security principal could be a user object, managed service account object, or group managed service account object.  You would then grant that security principal rights and permissions over the resource or grant it the right to impersonate a user and access the resource on the user’s behalf.  The part we want to focus in on is the impersonation or delegation to access a resource on the behalf of a user.  In AD DS that delegation is accomplished through the Kerberos protocol.

When we shift over to AAD the same basic concepts still exist of creating a security principal to represent the application and granting that application direct or delegated access to a resource.  The difference is the protocol handling the access shifts from Kerberos to OAuth 2.0.  One thing many people become confused about is thinking that OAuth handles authentication.  It doesn’t.  It has nothing do with authentication and everything to do with authorization, or more clearly delegation.  When we add an application the AAD a service principal object and sometimes application object (in AWS instance both are created) are created in the AAD tenant to represent the application.  I’m going to speak to the service principal object for the AWS integration, but you can read through this link for a good walkthrough on application and service principal objects and how they differ.

Now back to AWS.  So we added the application and we now have a service principal object in our tenant representing AWS.  Here is a few of the attributes for the object pulled via PowerShell.

awsservice.png

Review of the attributes for the object provide a few pieces of interesting information.   We’ll get to experiment more with what these mean when we start doing Fiddler captures, but let’s talk a bit about them now.  The AppRoles attribute provides a single default role of msiam_access.  Later on we’ll be adding additional roles that will map back to our AWS IAM roles.

Next up we have the KeyCredentials which contains two entries.  This attribute took me a while to work out.  In short, based upon the startDate, I think these two entries are referencing the self-signed certificate included in the IdP metadata that is created after the application is added to the directory.  I’ll cover the IdP metadata in the next entry.

The Oauth2Permissions are a bit funky for this use case since we’re not really allowing the application to access AWS on our behalf, but rather asking it to produce a SAML assertion asserting our identity.  Maybe the delegation can be thought of as delegating Azure AD the right to create logical security tokens representing our users that can be used to assert an identity to AWS.

The PasswordCredentials contains a single entry which shares the same KeyID as the KeyCredential.  As best I can figure from reading the documentation is this would normally contain entries for client keys when not using certificate authentication.  Given that it contains a single entry with the same KeyID as the KeyCredential for signing, I can only guess it will contain an entry even with a certificate is used to authenticate the application.

The last attributes of interest are the PreferredTokenSigningKeyThumbprint which references the certificate within the IdP metadata and the replyURLs which is the assertion consumer URI for AWS.

So yeah, that’s what happens in those 2 or 3 seconds the AWS application is registered with Azure AD.  I found it interesting how the service principal object is used to represent trust between Azure AD and AWS and all the configuration information attached to the object after the application is simply added.  It’s nice to have some of the configuration work done for us out of the box, but there is much more to do.

In the next entry I’ll walk through the Quick Start for the AWS application configuration and explore the metadata Azure AD creates.

The journey continues in my third entry.

Experimenting with the Azure B2B API

Hello all!

On October 31st Microsoft announced the public preview of the Azure B2B Invitation API. Prior to the introduction of the API, the only way to leverage the B2B feature was through the GUI. Given that B2B is Microsoft’s solution to collaboration with trusted partners in Office 365, the lack of the capability to programmatically interact with the feature was very limiting. The feature is now exposed through Azure’s Graph API as documented here.

A friend challenged me to write a script or small application that would leverage the API (Yes we are that nerdy.) Over the past year I’ve written a number of PowerShell scripts that query for information from OneDrive and Azure AD so I felt I would challenge myself by writing a small .NET Forms application. Now I have not done anything significant in the programming realm since freshman year of college so I thought this would be painful. Thankfully I have a copy of Visual Studio that comes with my MSDN subscription. All I can say is wow, development solutions have evolved since the 90s.

I won’t bore you with the amount of Googling and reading on MSDN I did over the weekend. Suffice to say it was a lot. Very tedious but an awesome learning experience. I can see a ton of re-use of the code I came up with for future experiments (even though I’m sure any real developer would point and laugh).

Before I jump into the detail, I want to mention how incredibly helpful Fiddler was in getting this all working and getting a deep dive understanding of how this all works. If you’re interesting in learning the magic of how all this “modern” stuff works, a tool like Fiddler is a must.

First off we need to register the application in Azure AD as a Native App to obtain a Client ID per this article. Next we need to grant the application the delegated right to read and write directory data as described in the MS article introducing the API. Once the application is registered and the rights have been granted, we can hammer out the code.

Before I jump into the code and the Fiddler traces, one thing that caught my eye in the returned json object was an attribute named invitedToGroups. If you’re familiar with the Azure B2B functionality, you’ll recall that as part of the B2B provisioning process, you can add the user object to a group. This is very useful in saving you time from having to do this after the user accepts the invitation and their user objects populates in the Azure AD. What’s odd about this is this attribute isn’t documented in the Microsoft blog I linked above. Digging into the github documentation, it looks like the information about it was removed. Either way, I decided to play around it with, but regardless of whether or not I followed the schema mentioned in the removed Github documentation, I couldn’t get it to take. I am fairly sure I got the schema of the attribute/value pair correctly, so we’ll have to chalk this up to MS playing with feature while the functionality is in public preview.

So let’s take a look at the code of this simple Windows form application, shall we?

In this first section of code, I’m simply pulling some information from the input fields within the forms application.

// Pull data from user input fields
string tenantid = tenant.Text;
string emailaddress = email.Text;
string redirectsite = redirect.Text;
string group = GroupID.Text;

In this new section of code, I’m leveraging functions from the ADAL library to redirect the user to authenticate against Azure AD, obtain an authorization code for the graph API, and submit that code for an access token for the Graph API.

// Authenticate user and obtain access token
AuthenticationContext authcontext = new AuthenticationContext("https://login.microsoftonline.com/" + tenantid);
AuthenticationResult token = authcontext.AcquireToken("https://graph.microsoft.com", clientid, redirectURI, PromptBehavior.Always);

In this section of code I build an instance of the httpclient class that will be used to submit my web request. You’ll notice I’m attaching the bearer access token I obtained in the early step.

// Deliver the access token to the B2B endpoint along with the posting the JWT with the invite information
string URL = "https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/";
HttpClient client = new HttpClient();
client.BaseAddress = new Uri(URL);
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new
System.Net.Http.Headers.AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", token.AccessToken);
Client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Accept.Add(new
System.Net.Http.Headers.MediaTypeWithQualityHeaderValue("application/json"));

Here I issue my HTTP request to post to the invitation endpoint and include json object with the necessary information to create an invitation.

HttpRequestMessage request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post,
"invitations");
request.Content = new StringContent("{"invitedUserEmailAddress":"" + emailaddress + "","inviteRedirectUrl":"" + redirectsite + "","sendInvitationMessage":true,"invitedToGroups":[{"group":"" + group + ""}]}", Encoding.UTF8, "application/json");
HttpResponseMessage response = await client.SendAsync(request);

Finally I parse the json object (using the Newtonsoft library) that is returned by the endpoint to check to see whether or not the operation was completed.

string content = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
Newtonsoft.Json.Linq.JToken json = Newtonsoft.Json.Linq.JObject.Parse(content);
string myresult = json.Value("status");
MessageBox.Show(myresult);

Quite simple right? It had to be for someone as terrible as developing as I am. Imagine the opportunities for an API like this in the hands of a good developer? The API could be leveraged to automate this whole process in an enterprise identity management tool allowing for self-service for company users who need to collaborate with trusted partners. Crazy cool.

This is the stuff I applaud Microsoft for. They’ve take a cumbersome process, leveraged modern authentication and authorization protocols, provided a very solid collection of libraries, and setup a simple to use API that leverages industry standard methodologies and data formats. Given the scale of cloud and the requirement for automation, simple and robust APIs based upon industry standards are hugely important to the success of a public cloud provider.

This whole process was an amazing learning experience where I had an opportunity to do something I’ve never done before and mess with technologies that are very much cutting edge. Opportunities like this to challenge myself and problem solve out of my comfort zone are exactly why I love IT.

I hope the above post has been helpful and I can’t wait to see how this feature pans out when it goes GA!

Feel free to reach out if you’re interested in a copy of my terrible app.

Thanks!